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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
LABOR LAW: THREAT OF REPRISAL PRESUMED FROM
EMPLOYER PLANT REMOVAL STATEMENTS
N LRB v. Yokelll indicates that section 8 (c), the free speech pro-
vision of the National Labor Relations Act,2 will not protect the
employer who speaks to employees of plant removal during an or-
ganizational campaign unless he carries the burden of proving that
no threat of reprisal could reasonably be inferred from his state-
ment. Yokell, copartner in the Crescent Art Linen Company, met
with the employees to discuss unionization, working conditions, and
employee complaints shortly after the Retail, Wholesale and Depart-
ment Store Union launched an organizational drive at the company.
At or immediately following the meeting, he mentioned that the
company's lease, which was to expire in ten months, had not yet
been renewed, and that it was possible that the plant might be
moved. The trial examiner found this to be an implied threat of
reprisal for union activity.3 The National Labor Relations Board,
and thereafter the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, affirmed,
concluding that the statement was unprotected by section 8 (c), which
had been asserted by Yokell as a defense to a section 8 (a) (1) unfair
labor practice charge.
The degree to which the statutory right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively' may properly encroach upon the free speech
guaranty of the first amendment remains unclear, despite much liti-
gation of the point since the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935.5
From its inception, the NLRB was quick to condemn anti-union
statements made to employees by an employer or his representative,
recognizing the potential for coercive impact which employer speech
may have upon economically dependent employees.6 Unfair labor
387 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1967).
29 U.S.C. § 158 (c) (1964).
a Crescent Art Linen Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 447 (1966).
'National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
8 Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449; see Bok, The Regulation of Campaign
Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv.
L. Rnv. 38, 68 (1964); Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda and the National Labor
Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 243, 278 (1963).
6 Rockford Mitten & Hosiery Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 501, 506-07 (1939); Ford Motor Co.,
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practice charges arising from such statements were often sustained by
the courts with little consideration of the constitutional problem
presented.7 In 1941, however, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v.
Virginia Electric & Power Company,8 construing the NLRA to avoid
constitutional conflict, held that speech violates the Act only when
coercive on its face or when, in light of other circumstances, a
coercive effect may be inferred. The Taft-Hartley Act incorporated
the Supreme Court's standard into the fabric of the NLRA. Today,
no expression of views, argument, or opinion may evidence or consti-
tute an unfair labor practice unless, when tested objectively, its
reasonably foreseeable effect is to threaten employees with reprisal
or force, or to influence their opinion with promise of benefit.'0
In applying this standard to an employer's statement found by
the NLRB to contain a threat of reprisal, appellate courts have ex-
amined the contested statement itself," and when not patently
coercive, the totality of circumstances surrounding its publication. 2
14 N.L.R.B. 346, 379 (1939), modified, 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940); see Note, 15 U.
FLA. L. RyV. 231, 231-32 (1962); ef. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72,
78 (1940). Courts and commentators have noted a strong psychological desire on the
part of employees for employment security. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1964) (concurring opinion); G. BLooM & H. NORTHRUP,
ECONOMSc OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATiONs 4 (1950); A. Cox S. D. BoK, CAsEs &
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 428 (6th ed. 1965); cf. United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe
Mfg. Co., 183 F. Supp. 568, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
7See, e.g., Valley Mould & Iron Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1940). But
see NLRZ v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940); Note, Limitations Upon
an Employer's Right of Noncoercive Free Speech, 38 VA. L. REv. 1037, 1038-40 (1952).
See also Adell, Employer Free Speech in the United States and Canada, 4 ALBERTA L.
REV. 11, 12 (1965).
8314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941).
9 Labor Management Relations Act § 8 (c), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (c) (1964); see 93 Cowa.
REc. 3837 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
20National Labor Relations Act § 8 (c), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (c) (1964); see, e.g., NLRB
v. Golub, 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d
753, 759-60 (9th Cir. 1967); Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1967);
Wausau Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Kingsford,
313 F.2d 826, 832 (6th Cir. 1963); Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 96, 99 (7th
Cir. 1959); cf. Jas H. Matthews & Co. v. NLRB, 354 F.2d 432, 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1002 (1966) (objective test to determine if employer's no-solicitation rule
violated employee rights); Edward Fields, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 754, 759 (2d Cir.
1963) (similar test in employer interrogation cases).
"See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1964) (phrasing
of speech examined).
12 See, e.g., Russel-Newman Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 370 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1966);
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 898, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1966); NLRB v.
D'Armigene, Inc., 353 F.2d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Laars Eng'rs, Inc., 332
F.2d 664, 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964); NLRB v. Cousins Associates,
283 F.2d 242, 243 (2d Cir. 1960).
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Occasionally, opinions dealing with section 8 (c) questions have been
written in conclusory terms, labeling the employer's speech a
"threat," and thus condemned, or merely "prophecy," "prediction,"
or "opinion," within the ambit of section 8 (c) protection.13 A grow-
ing number of courts, however, are detailing their analyses, exam-
ining the manner in which,14 when, 5 and by whom the statement was
made;' 6 the geographic location of the plant, the type of industry,
and other indicia of the employees' level of sophistication in labor
relations;17 and the ability of the employer to control the event
which he presages,' 8 to determine the coercive potential of the
contested communication. This latter factor, control, has played a
significant role in evaluating statements made during an organiza-
tional campaign which threaten the core elements of job security,
wages, and continuing employment. 9 Statements indicating that
reduction of employment, a shutdown, or plant removal would fol-
1"E.g., Jervis Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1967) (threat); NLRB v.
Transport Clearings, Inc., 311 F.2d 519, 523 (5th Cir. 1962) (prophecy); cf. NLRB
v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 928 (2d Cir. 1967) (Hays, J., dissenting) (prediction);
NLRB v. Union Pacific Stages, Inc., 99 F.2d 153, 178-79 (9th Cir. 1938) (opinion).
"See, e.g., NLRB v. Mallory Plastics Co., 355 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 1966) (con-
versational communication held to be no threat); NLRB v. Laars Eng'rs, Inc., 332
F.2d 664, 666-67 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964) (letter was not a threat);
NLRB v. Abrasive Salvage Co., 285 F.2d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 1961) (interrogation held
to be threat).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. American Casting Serv., Inc., 365 F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir.
1966) (speech to assembled employees was threat); NLRB v. Collins & Aikman Corp.,
338 F.2d 743, 748 (5th Cir. 1964) (civic club newspaper advertisement not a threat);
NLR.B v. Cousins Associates, 283 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1960) (individual interrogation by
employer, over coffee, away from shop, held threat); NLRB v. Rockwell Mfg. Co.,
271 F.2d 109, 118 (3d Cir. 1959) (conversational communication while riding home
with employee no threat); NLRB v. Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 209 F.2d 596, 599 (2d
Cir. 1954) (compulsory interrogation in company offices held to be coercive).
10 See, e.g., NLRB v. Mallory Plastics Co., 355 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 1966) (im-
mediate supervisors on friendly relations with employees held no threat); NLRB v.
Clearfield Cheese Co., 322 F.2d 89, 93 n.2 (3d Cir. 1963) (threat from one of co-owners);
Schwob Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 864, 869 (5th Cir. 1962) (no threat from super-
visor with little authority to control employees); NLRB v. Morris Fishman & Sons, 278
F.2d 792, 796 (3d Cir. 1960) (foreman's statements were threat); Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d
769, 771 (7th Cir. 1948) (supervisory employee with no anti-union record, no threat).
27 See, e.g., NLRB v. Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 355 F.2d 426, 432 (8th Cir.
1966) (Larson, J., dissenting) (factors for NLRB's specialized experience); NLRB v.
Collins & Aikman Corp., 338 F.2d 743, 748 (5th Cir. 1964) (sophistication among
factors to be considered).
2, E.g., Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1967).
"'See, e.g., NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1967); NLRB
v. Louisiana Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 696, 702 (8th Cir. 1967); Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
341 F.2d 756, 761 (6th Cir. 1965); International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB,
289 F.2d 757, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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low unionization have been uniformly condemned by reviewing
courts20 except when, in good faith and upon some reasonable
basis, the employer has explained that economic factors will necessi-
tate the change.21 Until NLRB v. Yokell, the threat of reprisal
conditioned on unionization, where found in these cases, had been
express, or could be readily implied from other anti-union conduct
of the employer.22  The campaign in Yokell, however, was not
characterized by employer threats of reprisal, but with promise of
benefit, and the contested statement was made during or after an
informal meeting at which both employer and employees aired their
problems.23
Recognizing the constitutional stature of the question before it,
the Yokell court essayed a balance between the first amendment prin-
ciples which it noted underlie section 8 (c) and potential subrogation
of other rights guaranteed by the Act. The court observed that the
statement had been made far in advance of the lease expiration, in
the context of an organizational campaign, without adequate ex-
planation of the timing of disclosure.2 4  Further, no "economic
cause-and-effect relationship" between relocation of the plant and
its unionization was readily apparent; and the employer's ability to
control the occurrence of the event was clear. Thus, the court con-
cluded, the statement could justifiably be treated as an implied
threat of reprisal, "likely to instill fear in the employees that dire
20E.g., NLRB v. Louisiana Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Amcri-
can Casting Serv., Inc., 365 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Associated Naval Archi-
tects, 355 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1966); NLRI3 v. D'Armigene, Inc., 353 F.2d 406 (2d Cir.
1965); Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965); Surprenant Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Plant City Steel Corp, 331 F.2d
511 (5th Cir. 1964); NLR.B v. Realist, Inc., 328 F.2d 840 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 994 (1964); A.P. Green Fire Brick Co. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 910 (8th. Cir. 1964);
NLRB v. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, 325 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1963); Marshfield Steel Co.
v. NLRB, 324 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 322 F.2d 89
(3d Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Abrasive Salvage Co., 285 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1961); Interna-
tional Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1960); NLRB
v. Somerset Classics, Inc., 193 F.2d 613 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952).
21 See, e.g., NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1967) (unioniza-
tion might produce wage decreases); NLRB v. Brownwood Mfg. Co., 363 F.2d 136,
138 (5th Cir. 1966); Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1964);
NLRB v. Transport Clearings, Inc., 311 F.2d 519, 523 (5th Cir. 1962); Union Carbide
Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 844, 845 (6th Cir. 1962).
22 See cases cited note 20 supra.
22 387 F.2d at 754, 756.
241d. at 756.
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steps of retaliation would result from an authorization of the
Union as their bargaining representative. '25
Yokell, in effect, presumes that plant relocation statements made
in the context of an organizational campaign are intended as threats
of reprisal, placing the burden on the employer to prove either that
the economic effects of unionization will require the change, or that
explanation accompanying the statement negated any coercive effect.
Read strictly, YokelU suggests that even when legitimate reasons
for relocation, unconnected with the possibility of unionization, do
exist, an employer will be restricted from expressing them to em-
ployees during the course of an organizational campaign. This pre-
sumption and restriction can readily be extended to employer state-
ments concerning potential derogation of other core aspects of
employment security. Employees' strong psychological desire for
such security, when coupled with the employer's ability to control
employment, would appear to justify strict limitations on employer
speech in an organizational context. Nevertheless, if it is reasonable
to believe that unionization will in fact force an adjustment in em-
ployment conditions, this information should be conveyed to em-
ployees. If a union is still desired, the accompanying consequences
will at least have been knowingly accepted. 26 As Yokell clearly
indicates, however, an employer who has a valid reason for initiating
plant relocation or other major employment changes wisely will
avoid mention of it until representation proceedings are complete,
unless he is prepared to assure employees, to their satisfaction and
that of the Board, that the outcome of the campaign will have no
effect on the change he foresees or proposes.
2 Id.
20 Cf. Bok, supra note 5, at 76-77.
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